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The European Union budget is subject to a strict annual balanced budget rule. Given 
different types of expenditure within the budget, this rule has most effect on - and is 
most threatened by - spending on the Common Agricultural Policy. This article 
examines the merits of applying a balanced budget rule to the EU budget and explores 
the links between the budget and the CAP. The presence of the rule also forced the 
EU to improve its financial management. The 1999 CAP reform is examined. The 
presence of a pre-agreed spending limit on the CAP forced changes to be made to the 
initial CAP reform agreement in order to comply with this limit, although political 
bargaining was critical in shaping the changes. The general perception is that the CAP 
drives the European budget. The budget, if not driving the CAP, imposes an 




In several key respects the central budget of the European Union (hereinafter, the 
EUB) is quite different from member state governments’ national budgets, notably 
that it is much smaller than national budgets and that it must be in balance each year. 
There are also different types of expenditure, differentiated by which European 
institution has ultimate control over their determination. The purpose of this paper is 
to assess the role of the balanced-budget rule as it applies to the EUB. It argues that 
this rule has had the greatest relevance for and impact on agricultural support 
expenditures and has ultimately been crucial in driving agricultural policy reforms 
through the 1980s and 1990s. It is also argued the balanced budget rule has been 
central to EU reforms improving the financial management of the EUB. 
 The paper starts by outlining some key features of the EUB. It then explores 
the issue of the balanced budget rule, considering the suitability of the EUB for the 
application of this rule. Section 4 identifies some concerns over the application of this 
rule and examines the relevance of these concerns to the EUB. Section 5 then focuses 
on the role of reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy in supporting EU fiscal 
restraint. In Section 6 this argument is taken one step further, by arguing that the 1999 
CAP reforms were effectively constrained by a very tight expenditure limit, agreed 
within the overall balanced budget. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The European Union Budget: Some Important Features 
The EUB has long been the source of much political debate and disagreement 
between the member states of the EU. Its political significance is, however, much 
greater than its size. In 1997 the EUB spent about ECU 79.3 billion, approximately 
£54.9 billion (see Court of Auditors, 1998). This compares with current national 
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government expenditures of about ECU 467 billion in the UK, about ECU 838 billion 
in Germany and about ECU 3339 billion for the fifteen EU member states in total (all 
figures in current prices). EU expenditure represents about 1% of EU GDP, whereas 
national general government current expenditures in 1997 ranged from about 32% of 
national GDP in Ireland to over 61% in Sweden, with an EU average (excluding 
Luxembourg) of 46.6% (data from European Commission, 1998). 
 A second distinguishing feature of the EUB is that it has to be in balance each 
year. Although the EU has the ability to borrow funds through, for example, the 
European Investment Bank, it cannot use this facility to fund the general operational 
expenditures that are covered by the European Economic Community (EEC). There 
is, in short, no facility for deficit financing. This rule was broken in the mid 1980s 
and exceptional temporary measures were needed to allow the EU to continue funding 
its policies (this is discussed further below). The principle of the balanced budget has, 
however, generally been adhered to. 
 To complicate matters, EU expenditure can be classified in different ways, 
according to when the expenditure is due. It is a general operating rule of the EUB 
that it is proposed and agreed each year. Some EU policy expenditures, such as 
‘guarantee’ expenditures under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that support 
farm incomes, only apply to the year in question. Other policies, for example regional 
spending, involve multi-annual payments to particular projects. Thus in any one year 
there will be expenditures due from projects agreed in previous years, as well as 
expenditures due in future years on projects agreed in the current year. Where 
expenditures only apply to the year in question, such as CAP guarantees, they are 
known as non-differentiated appropriations. When payments are to be made over 
more than one year, the expenditures are known as differentiated appropriations. They 
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are split into payment appropriations (where expenditures identified in the current 
year are also made in the current year) and commitment appropriations (which 
includes expenditures identified in the current year to be made in future years). From 
this, appropriations for payment are the total of non differentiated appropriations and 
payment appropriations from the current year, plus commitment appropriations from 
previous years where payment is due in the current year. The balanced budget rule is 
then applied to appropriations for payment.1 
 A further distinction between different expenditure items is rather more 
arbitrary, but nonetheless extremely important. Article 272 of the Treaty of Rome 
(previously Article 203), distinguishes between ‘expenditure necessarily resulting 
from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance therewith’ and ‘expenditure other 
than that necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance 
therewith’ (this author’s emphasis). The former is commonly known as compulsory 
expenditure and the latter as non-compulsory expenditure. The main element of 
compulsory expenditure is agricultural guarantee spending, although food aid 
measures, certain administrative costs and some monetary reserves are also classified 
as compulsory. Everything else is non-compulsory. 
 The origin of this distinction is the Luxembourg Treaty of 1970, which 
granted the Assembly (now the European Parliament) greater powers over the EUB. 
The ultimate decision making powers for non-compulsory expenditures were given to 
the Assembly, whereas for compulsory expenditures they were retained by the 
Council of Ministers. This has effectively constrained the degree of financial 
autonomy enjoyed by the Assembly/Parliament. The reason for this lies in how total 
expenditure under each type is determined. For compulsory expenditures, the essence 
is that once policies and policy goals have been determined within the Treaty (eg the 
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objectives and policy instruments for agricultural guarantees under Article 33, 
previously Article 39), the EU is then obliged to spend as much as is necessary to 
fulfil those goals. With non-compulsory expenditures, however, the total sums 
available are limited and subject to a maximum rate of increase each year. In effect, 
for compulsory expenditures the policies are determined and the expenditure 
commitment is then open-ended, whereas for non-compulsory expenditures the 
spending limit is imposed and then the funds are allocated between competing claims. 
 One of the main problems that led to the Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 was the 
proposal to increase the budgetary powers of the Assembly in line with the EUB 
being granted its own resources, independent of the member states. Given the 
opposition of France to the transfer of powers away from the member states (through 
the Council) to the Assembly in 1965, it approved of the distinction made in the 
Luxembourg Treaty as it believed the arrangements placed an effective limit on the 
autonomy of the Assembly. Despite subsequent changes to the balance of power 
between institutions, the basic distinction remains and in terms of financial growth 
and political significance, the areas of activity over which Parliament has financial 
control have remained subordinate to those areas (principally CAP guarantees) 
controlled by the Council, even though non-compulsory expenditures have risen as a 
share of the EUB from about a fifth initially to about a half currently. 
 
3. The Rule of the Balanced Budget 
There is an extensive literature on the design and application of balanced budget rules 
(see, inter alia, Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1996; Corsetti and Roubini 1996; Poterba 
1994, 1996; Robinson 1996). The principal focus of this literature is the application of 
the balanced budget rule to sub-national levels of government, in particular regions 
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within (fiscal) federations. With sub-national governments, the application of the 
balanced budget rule is shown to contribute to fiscal restraint. Poterba (1996) suggests 
that differences between US state practices towards balanced budget rules and state 
fiscal outcomes in the US indicate those states that reduce spending to keep within 
short term budget limits also have lower levels of spending in the long term. 
 In terms of the main fiscal functions that can be allocated to budgets, it is 
typically the case that sub-national budgets undertake allocation and distribution 
roles. In contrast with national government budgets, however, typically they do not 
undertake stabilization. This distinction is important in terms of the balanced budget 
rule, insofar as this rule requires budgets to balance each year. By their nature, 
stabilization expenditures will fluctuate as the economy moves through the economic 
cycle and is hit by short term shocks. To impose a balanced budget rule on a budget 
with the stabilization function could require large year to year movements in revenues 
or, alternatively, constrain the effectiveness with which stabilization could be 
undertaken by limiting the finances available for stabilization. 
 In the case of the EUB the focus is not on sub-national budgets but on a supra-
national budget. The EUB can, however, be compared directly to sub-national 
budgets in that it too undertakes distribution and allocation, but does not have a role 
in economic stabilization - that function is still performed by national budgets. Thus 
the difficulties of trying to maintain budgetary balance in the face of cyclical 
stabilization expenditures are not encountered. A further factor supporting the 
imposition of the balanced budget rule to the EUB concerns political accountability. 
The EUB is further away from voters and the balanced budget rule is thus a means by 
which voters can be reassured that expenditures will not be allowed to rise without 
limit or effective control. Indeed, it was the wish of the authors of the Treaty of Rome 
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“not....to offer the Communities, and in particular the Commission, any easy 
solutions” (Strasser 1992, page 57) in determining expenditures and revenues. 
 If stabilization would bring into question the appropriateness of applying a 
balanced budget rule, what can be said of the distribution function (under which 
heading spending on regional and structural measures and the CAP represent between 
80% and 90% of total EUB outlays each year)? By definition, the growth in regional 
spending is limited each year since it is classified as non-compulsory expenditure and 
is thus determined by policy process rather than external economic factors subject to 
shocks. With the CAP, as will be seen further below, spending is determined by 
several factors but typically not economic cycles nor shocks to economies. In general, 
therefore, the principal expenditures undertaken by the EUB are not subject to the 
same fluctuations as stabilization and thus the balanced budget rule is not an 
inappropriate means of controlling EUB expenditures. 
 In contrast to most of the literature on balanced budget rules, Robinson (1996) 
argues against the use of the ‘standard’ balanced budget rule at the sub-national level. 
He suggests that rather than balancing the budget every year, what is needed is a 
policy of keeping stable the level of public goods provision. This includes lumpy 
capital expenditures, so balanced budget policies will lead to variations in tax levels 
to accommodate such expenditures. Thus he argues that deficits should be permitted 
to absorb variations in capital expenditures in particular. “The rule that budgets 
should be structurally balanced on an accrual basis, when coupled with some type of 
ceiling on debt/output, is probably the best formulation presently available” (page 
60). The EUB, however, only undertakes current expenditures negotiated within an 
annual budget process and does not include capital expenditures. The narrowness of 
the range of economic functions undertaken by the EUB, in this case just current 
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expenditures, therefore further supports the application of the balanced budget rule to 
the EUB. 
 
4. Alesina & Perotti and Balanced Budget Rules: The Paradox of the EU Budget 
Regarding the suitability of balanced budget rules, Alesina and Perotti (1996) caution 
against such rules on several grounds. These include the possibility of greater 
volatility in tax rates in order to match the movement of budget expenditures (as 
discussed above with stabilization expenditures), the danger that such strict rules 
“increase the incentives for creative and nontransparent accounting” (Alesina and 
Perotti op cit, page 402) and a concern that with multiyear financial plans, “the really 
tough policies are systematically postponed to year 2, 3, or 4 of the plan and never 
implemented, since multiyear plans can be revised every year.” (ibid, page 403) The 
extent to which these concerns apply to the EUB are now considered. 
 Regarding fluctuations in spending, the EUB does not undertake stabilization 
and non-compulsory expenditures are subject to a ceiling on their annual rate of 
growth. Compulsory expenditures, essentially CAP guarantees, are discussed in more 
detail below. What volatility there has been in expenditures is linked more to climatic 
conditions (affecting supply) and the ECU:Dollar exchange rate than to the business 
cycle or economic shocks. Recent reforms have, moreover, changed the balance of 
CAP expenditures, placing a much greater emphasis on direct payments, independent 
even of these variables and should increase further the stability of CAP spending. 
This is illustrated below in Table 3. 
 Transparency and creative accounting, as they apply to the EUB have, 
however, raised problems. Concerns have focused mainly on CAP spending, but there 
were problems with regional spending as well. The worst problems came to light 
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during the mid 1980’s. A report from the European Commission in 1987 opened with 
this frank assessment of the situation (EC Commission 1987, page 1): 
 
The Community is at present faced with a budgetary situation which can 
only be described as being on the brink of bankruptcy. The unfolding of 
this situation should come as no surprise to the Community as it has 
developed gradually in the course of several years, and it has been 
announced with increasing disquiet by the Commission during this period. 
The background is, of course, complex, but some fundamental factors may 
be distinguished: 
 
- First of all, the Community has sunk into a morass of budgetary 
malpractices needed to conceal or postpone the real financial implications 
of Community policies.............. 
- Secondly, the own resources system itself has proved increasingly 
inadequate.............. 
- Thirdly, the Community has not been equipped with the necessary means 
to adapt policies to the desired expenditure scenarios.............. 
 
The central problem was the open-ended nature of compulsory expenditure. On the 
back of ineffective political constraint and inappropriate policy decisions regarding 
the CAP, agricultural expenditures grew until, in 1984 and 1985, total EUB spending 
rose through the own resources ceiling, requiring additional payments from member 
states in those two years simply to allow the EU to continue to function and fulfil its 
policy obligations. With the CAP, there was a simple short term means of postponing 
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expenditures, given the EU was ‘on the brink of bankruptcy’. As surpluses of various 
products rose, there were essentially two alternative outlets - export and intervention. 
Products sold for export received a subsidy equal to the difference between the 
internal EU price and the third country selling price. Alternatively, when products 
were sold into intervention, costs of storage had to be met, as did the difference 
between the intervention price and the third country selling price when the products 
were finally exported. The latter element is effectively the same as the export subsidy 
on open market sales, but is treated differently within the EUB. 
 The important difference between export and intervention came in the timing 
of the claim on the EUB for these costs. With exports from the open market, the EUB 
had to reimburse the exporter for the subsidy within weeks of export. With 
intervention, however, whilst the member states were reimbursed storage costs month 
by month the largest cost - that of the subsidy on export - could be delayed until the 
product was sold out of intervention. For cereals, this occurred on average two and a 
half years later (Ackrill 1992, page 5.26). In effect, intervention stocks were 
significantly over-valued, as the book value was recorded as the purchase price rather 
than the resale price. The result was a delay in expenditures incurred by the EUB, 
brought about by a delay in stock re-valuation until the goods were sold from 
intervention. Table 1 demonstrates the extent of the problem: 
 
TABLE 1: Agricultural Stocks (end of year levels), billion ECU 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Value at:       
Intervention Prices 4.0 7.0 8.8 10.6 11.2 12.3 
Market Prices 2.2 3.6 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.2 
Depreciation Required 45% 49% 51% 54% 67% 66% 
Source: EC Commission, 1987, page 7. 
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 In addition, there were financial malpractices with the financing of certain regional 
projects, creating the “cost of the past”. This referred to the problem whereby “heavy 
spending commitments had been built-up under the various structural funds and that 
these had not been matched by a corresponding pattern of spending: thus there is a 
major overhang of expenditure to be funded in future years.” (Swinbank 1988, pages 
5-6. See also Swinbank 1986). 
 Table 2 summarises the total cost of this financial mismanagement. Up to 
1985, the official limit on the VAT own resource contribution was 1.0% of the VAT 
base. In 1984, agreement at the Fontainebleau Summit led to this being increased to 
1.4% from 1986. Table 2 shows the extent to which additional payments were needed 
in 1984 and 1985 (in those years, the actual VAT rate applicable was still 1.0%), as 
well as the increased VAT limit being used up in full in 1986, the first year the extra 
resources became available. 
 
TABLE 2: Actual budget and true budget, as % VAT rate required for financing 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Actual budget VAT rate 1.00 1.14 1.23 1.40 1.39 
non-budgeted expenditure:      
current deficit1 - - - 0.10 0.23 
non-depreciation of agricultural stocks 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.03 
“cost of the past” 0.09 0.06 0.09 - - 
VAT rate needed for proper financing 1.22 1.28 1.40 1.60 1.65 
Accumulated liabilities (billion ECU) 3.0 6.0 8.6 12.2 17.0 
1 - deficit on CAP guarantee expenditures and traditional own resources shortfall for 1986 and 1987. 
Source: Based on EC Commission 1987, page 4. 
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Alesina and Perotti’s concerns that balanced budget rules “increase the incentives for 
creative and nontransparent accounting” are therefore seen to have had strong 
foundation in considering the EUB. The third problem they identify with balanced 
budget rules concerns multiyear financial plans, in particular a possible lack of 
transparency in the budget process that such an approach may generate. This could 
provide a means by which the budgetary authority could delay or avoid difficult 
policy decisions. Following the budget crisis of 1984 and 1985 and the full utilisation 
of budgetary resources in 1986 and 1987, a package of reforms was agreed in 
Brussels in February 1988 to both the CAP and the EUB. Given the concerns of 
Alesina and Perotti, it is interesting to note that an important part of the reforms 
involved the introduction of multiyear financial plans, the so-called ‘financial 
perspectives’. 
 These plans, so far covering 1988-1992, 1993-1999 and 2000-2006 chart the 
growth of expenditure permitted on individual policies, but also give direction to 
broader policy aims. Thus spending on structural policies has been growing in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of total expenditures, whereas CAP spending has 
generally been growing in absolute terms, but falling as a percentage of total 
spending. Although the detailed budgetary decisions are still taken through the annual 
budget process, multiyear financial plans have helped increase the transparency of the 
budget process and clarified the limits within which each annual decision is taken. 
 The paradox of the concerns of Alesina and Perotti vis-a-vis the EUB lies in 
the way the EU responded to the financial crises of the mid 1980s. There was clearly 
financial mismanagement with the EUB at the time, but what brought that crisis to 
peoples’ attention was the very presence of the balanced budget rule and the 
exhaustion of budgetary resources in 1984 and 1985. It can be argued that the 1988 
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reforms, including the introduction of multiyear financial plans, have been 
instrumental in bringing stability to EU finances. One of these reform measures dealt 
directly with the problem of the “cost of the past”. At the root of the problem was the 
failure to depreciate the value of stocks to reflect their resale value rather than 
purchase price. The 1988 reforms require that now, stocks must be fully depreciated - 
and the EUB pay the member states this cost - by the end of the financial year in 
which they are purchased. Thus the EUB must bear the full financial cost of 
depreciation during the year of purchase, rather than delay this expenditure perhaps 
several years until stocks are re-sold.2 In addition, special financial provision was 
made to depreciate existing stocks, the cost of which was spread over the years 1988 
to 1992. 
 Alesina and Perotti (1995, page 25) also suggest that balanced budget rules 
result in a “loss of flexibility in reacting to shocks on expenditure or revenues.” 
Another reform introduced in 1988 has addressed this directly. Since 1988, the EUB 
has included a number of reserves that have been designed to deal with financial 
shocks. One of the main shocks to affect CAP expenditures is movements in the 
ECU:Dollar exchange rate affecting, for example, export subsidy expenditures by 
altering the dollar price of EU exports. If, compared with the initial budget, exchange 
rate movements result in expenditures being affected by at least 200 million ECU, 
then the ‘Monetary Reserve’ can be called into action, up to a maximum of 500 
million ECU.3 This operates symmetrically, so that financial gains can be added to 
the reserve as well as extra costs being covered from the reserve. In 1993, following 
crises and upheaval in the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the reserve could also be 
drawn upon in cases where realignments within the European Monetary System 
pushed expenditures beyond the guideline. This reserve and others (see EC 
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Commission 1995, pages 67 and 74-76), offer a degree of flexibility to the budget, 
whilst the cap on available funds helps ensure it does not significantly compromise 
the balanced budget rule. The rule of universality, whereby the EUB cannot ring-
fence monies for specific end-uses, is compromised but the sum is limited and the 
benefit is flexibility without financial mismanagement. Indeed, the negative reserve 
requires that additional expenditures in one or more policy areas are financed during 
the year from savings in other areas (EC Commission op cit, page 67). 
 A further budget reform in 1988 which helped bring stability to EU finances 
was the introduction of a new fourth own-resource, based on GNP. Previously, total 
own resources consisted of agricultural levies and tariff revenues, plus the VAT-based 
payment. From this total, member states were then reimbursed 10% to cover the costs 
of collecting the levies and tariff. Second, the rebate made to the UK for its 
inappropriately large net contribution had to be funded. By the mid 1980s, the effect 
of these two payments was to reduce the effective VAT rate from 1.4% to nearer 
1.25%, depriving the EU of funds for (non-compulsory) expenditures. The new 
system has traditional own resources paid over to the EU net of collection costs. Next, 
VAT is paid up to a limit, which has been reduced back to 1% from 1999. The 
remaining own-resource requirements then come from GNP, up to a limit imposed not 
on this GNP resource but on total own resources. In other words, the GNP resource 
acts as a top-up payment, taking total own resources available for funding EU 
activities up to the limit, set at 1.27% of EU GNP from 1999 and throughout the next 
financial perspective to 2006. In this way, neither the reimbursement of collection 
costs nor the UK rebate deprive the EUB of funds for the policies (effectively those 
whose expenditure is non-compulsory) set out in the financial perspective. 
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 5. The Role of CAP Reform in Improving Budgetary Discipline 
The effect of the balanced budget rule has been to constrain growth in EUB spending 
and ensure it remains within revenue limits. It has been seen how, in response to the 
one time when this rule was broken, the EU introduced several important changes to 
the EU budgetary process, notably in 1988, to help ensure this did not happen again. 
In terms of expenditure growth, however, the limit imposed on the annual rate of 
growth of non-compulsory expenditures means that the only significant source of 
growth in expenditures that could threaten the balanced budget rule remains 
compulsory spending, principally CAP guarantees. Thus the focus of expenditure 
reforms to complement the reforms to the revenue side of the budget has been to 
reform the CAP. 
 1988 was the first time the two inter-related policies of CAP and budget 
underwent simultaneous reform. It has been shown, for example, how changes in the 
treatment of intervention expenditures improved financial management and control. 
Although the share of the EUB taken up by the CAP has been falling for several 
years, it still absorbs about 50% of total spending. In the past, there have been 
problems of both rising and unpredictable expenditures. Whilst the nature of 
agriculture is such that production uncertainties cannot be totally removed, a further 
reform to the CAP, agreed in 1992, made significant changes to the nature of support 
and hence to budgetary stability. In particular, support prices were reduced 
significantly and replaced with direct income support payments. This shifted the 
composition of CAP guarantee expenditures away from export subsidies and 
intervention storage, towards direct compensation. 
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 This switch makes expenditure less dependent on supply and the ECU:Dollar 
exchange rate. Expenditures such as export subsidies, that are dependent on exchange 
rates, are now much less significant in terms of total CAP spending, as Table 3 below 
shows. This reform was thus matched by the reduction in the funds made available 
through the monetary reserve, from 1000 million ECU to 500 million ECU. 
Compensation payments, now the dominant element of expenditure on the arable 
sector, are instead dependent on previous yields and current arable area and should 
thus be more stable. The other side of the reforms, however, is that CAP spending 
rose quite sharply. This is to be expected, as support has switched from consumers 
(through high support prices) to taxpayers (through compensation paid directly from 
the EUB). Whilst expenditures have risen as the nature of support has shifted from 
consumers to taxpayers, the benefit should be greater stability, as expenditures are 
determined more by area than by production, surpluses and exchange rates. Table 3 
shows how, for the cereals sector, expenditure rose sharply during the period when 
the compensation payments were phased in (the 1993/4 to 1995/6 crop years), but has 
since become more stable. The recent rise in compensation payments and decline in 
set aside payments is related to the lowering of the set aside percentage required of 
large arable farmers. 
There is, moreover, a further benefit to come from the reform transferring 
CAP expenditures towards direct payments for farmers. Previously, the total cost of 
the CAP was considerably greater than the budgetary expenditure figures suggested. 
This is because the bulk of support was hidden in the form of high prices faced by 
consumers. As prices faced by consumers fall towards world market levels, so the 
margin of support provided by consumers falls.4 Instead, support is provided by 
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taxpayers and the cost is shown in the budget as budgetary expenditure. Thus this 
switch in the basis of support helps make the cost of the CAP much more transparent. 
 
TABLE 3: Rising Spending on the Arable Sector with the 1992 Reforms 
Cereals/Arable Expenditure Data (million ECU)       
year (*=forecast) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 
refunds 3139.7 2788.8 1513.2 1092.7 312.8 532.3 397 877
Intervention Storage1 2497.4 2723.8 186.7 62.7 -46.5 71.5 186 650
Intervention, other than storage 431.4 472.2 388.5 357.3 304.6 300.7 276 378
Co-Responsibility Levy -1067.9 149.7   
Compensation (small producers)   
-total arable 0 0 1756.4 2313.9 2875.6 2850 2596 2454
-of which, cereals 0 0 1634.4 2257.1 2838.9 2808.3 2559 2404
Compensation (large producers)   
-total arable 0 3292.1 7083.5 8780.5 10660.4 11815.6 12397 12178
-of which, cereals 0 425.9 3906 5909.6 7721.0 8796.4 9171 9363
Set Aside Compensation (new) 0 0 1290.1 2162 2112.1 1827.8 1240 1294
Total Set Aside 285.6 426.8 1712.9 2412.6 2271.4 1903.6 1250 1294
Total Cereals2 5742.5 6987.1 9340.8 12090.6 13495.2 14412.8 13839 14966
Total Arable 10356.2 10610.7 12652.3 15018.3 16372.3 17462.1 17102 17831
Total FEOGA Guarantee 31369.4 34590.4 32970.4 34502.7 39107.8 40674.9 40737 40735
Source: EU budgets, in Official Journals L34 1994, L369 1994, L22 1996, L44 1997, L44 1998 and L39 1999. 
Notes: 1: The negative figure for 1996 reflects large over-devaluation of intervention stocks, as discussed in the 
text. At this time, world prices rose to exceptionally high (and clearly unforeseen) levels. 
 2: Cereals includes all set aside payments as these are not differentiated by product. 
 
6. The 1999 CAP Reform: A Case of the Budget Constraining the CAP 
In preparation for the future enlargement of the EU, the national leaders at their 
summit in Berlin in March 1999 reached agreement on the financial perspective for 
the period 2000 to 2006, as well as reforms to regional policy and the CAP. In this 
section, certain key features of the CAP reform agreement will be outlined (a fuller 
analysis can be found in Ackrill 1999a, 1999b). It will be argued that this reform 
provides an outstanding example of how the limits imposed by the budget constrained 
 17
what was possible for the CAP. This will show how important the financial 
perspective, in conjunction with the balanced budget rule, has become in ensuring 
financial discipline in the EU, in contrast to the fears of Alesina and Perotti. 
 Table 4 summarises some of the key elements of the financial perspective 
agreed at Berlin. The original proposed spending limit on CAP guarantees, set down 
in the Agenda 2000 documents, was euro 312.5 billion over the period to 2006. At the 
Petersberg meeting of the European Council in late February 1999, however, a lower 
figure was agreed, of euro 40.5 billion per year or euro 283.5 billion over the full 
period of the agreement. Allowing spending to rise in line with inflation, assumed at 
2% a year, gives total real spending of euro 307.1 billion over the period to 2006. 
This figure became known as ‘stabilized’ expenditure and became the constraint that 
was placed on those negotiating the CAP reform. 
 
TABLE 4: Elements of the Financial Perspective, 2000-2006 (EU 15, 1999 prices, 
million euro, unless otherwise stated) 
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Agriculture 40920 42800 43900 43770 42760 41930 41660 
- CAP guarantees 36620 38480 39570 39430 38410 37570 37290 
- rural development, other measures 4300 4320 4330 4340 4350 4360 4370 
Structural Operations 32045 31455 30865 30285 29595 29595 29170 
Pre-Accession Aid 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 3120 
Total Payment Appropriations 89600 91110 94220 94880 91910 90160 89620 
-as %GNP 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.05 1.00 0.97 
Available for Accession   4140 6710 8890 11440 14220 
Ceiling on Payment Appropriations 89600 91110 98360 101590 100800 101600 103840 
- as %GNP 1.13 1.12 1.18 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.13 
Total Own Resources, %GNP 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 
Source: European Parliament, Council, Commission. Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary 
Discipline and Improvement of the Budgetary Procedure. Official Journal of the European 
Communities C172, 18.6.1999, pp. 1-22. 
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In mid-March 1999, the Ministers of Agriculture negotiated a reform of the CAP. 
Two problems arose with this, however. The first was that France refused to accept 
that a reform had indeed been agreed. According to Jean Glavany, the French 
minister, ‘notable advances’ had been made in the discussions, but argued that the 
‘decision’ had instead been an informal qualified majority-based vote, based on the 
negotiating positions of the national delegations. Whilst every other country believed 
an agreement had been concluded, France was adamant this was not the case. This 
concern notwithstanding, this reform ‘agreement’ would still have caused difficulties 
because it broke the budget expenditure limit agreed the previous month. Joschka 
Fischer, the German foreign minister, estimated the reform would cost euro 289.3 
billion. EU foreign ministers indicated they would need to ‘fine-tune’ the deal in 
order to reduce spending to the agreed limit, but did not intend to alter the basic 
features of the reform. The European Commission, on the other hand, noted that the 
agreed deal had raised spending by only 2% above the target figure and felt that 
further changes were ‘unlikely’. 
 In the end the CAP underwent further reform just two weeks later at the hands 
of the European Council at the Berlin summit. The basic direction of reform in the 
first agreement5 was to continue the pattern established in 1992, whereby support 
prices were cut and offset, at least in part, by direct payments. The first agreement 
established a cut in cereals prices of 20%, to be phased in over two years. Over that 
period, set aside would be retained and set at 10%. Once the full price cut had been 
implemented, set aside would normally be set at zero. The main change from the first 
to the second agreements was to retain the basic element of compensated price cuts, 
but to reduce the price cut to 15%. This would reduce the cost of the direct payments 
to farmers from the EUB by making them commensurately smaller.6 
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 Given, in particular, French opposition to significant change to the CAP and 
the desire of other countries to limit the rise in spending, these further changes made 
to the arable sector from the first to the second agreements raise several issues. 
Although the basic nature of reform remained intact, the smaller price cut will have 
certain important consequences. The first is that by making the price cut smaller, the 
level of cereals compensation is also made smaller, thus reducing the cost of the 
direct payments. In addition, oilseeds payments are to be cut to the same level as 
those for cereals. Given the smaller rise in cereals payments, the cut in oilseeds 
payments will need to be larger, thus again saving money. This was the aim in trying 
to adapt the reform to respect the ‘stabilized’ spending limit. The second consequence 
of the adjustments made in Berlin is that the internal European market price is 
expected, under normal world market conditions, to remain above the world price 
(according to OECD estimates). This implies export subsidies will be retained and, 
therefore, that an element of expenditure will continue to be subject to the vagaries of 
exchange rates. Despite this, between 2001 and 2003 the Monetary Reserve is to be 
phased out. This could mean that expenditures on export subsidies become more 
volatile as exchange rate impacts are no longer dampened by the reserve. 
 Moreover, given that export subsidies are to be retained, EU exports will 
continue to be subject to the constraints imposed as part of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By imposing 
a limit on the volume of exports that can be exported with the aid of subsidies, 
additional quantities will either need to be sold without subsidy or sold into 
intervention, precipitating a possible return to the problems of the mid 1980s. Thus 
whilst the second agreement ensured that the rise in expenditure on direct payments 
was restricted, a rise in subsidy and intervention expenditures is now a distinct 
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possibility. Moreover, under the second agreement set aside is to be retained at 10% 
to help restrain production and thus the size of the surplus. This is in contrast to the 
first agreement, when a price cut of 20% would lead to set aside normally set at zero. 
Indeed German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder felt the final agreement will lead to 
spending still rising above the agreed limit. Moreover Günther Verheugen, then 
German deputy foreign minister, conceded further reforms of the CAP would be 
needed before 2006. 
 These problems were created by the short-term nature of the budgetary 
savings agreed at Berlin, made through a partial reversal of the first agreement 
reforms. With an inherent conflict between simply replacing price support with direct 
payments and controlling the rise in budget costs, what alternatives were available? 
During the negotiations on CAP reform, several alternatives were considered but none 
could be agreed upon. Given the rise in budget costs consequent on the 20% price cut, 
each proposed alternative ways of dealing with this rise. These were modulation 
(limiting payments to certain classes of farm, principally the largest farms that receive 
most payments), co-financing (the sharing of the budgetary burden of the CAP 
between the EUB and national budgets) and degressivity (the gradual reduction in the 
size of the direct payments over time). 
 Co-financing reduces the cost of CAP support borne by the EUB, but does not 
reduce the overall cost of the policy. The 1999 reform agreement has introduced 
‘national envelopes’ for beef and dairy production. This allocates budget sums to 
national governments to distribute according to particular national or regional 
priorities. This is not the same as co-financing as it is an additional sum, although it 
does allow national governments to direct some support towards smaller farmers if 
they so choose. Nor does it limit the sums available under the general policy to large 
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farmers and thus is not a serious attempt at introducing modulation. Moreover, the 
total sum available (just over euro 1.4 billion from 2002) represents just 3.5% of total 
expected CAP guarantee spending in that year. 
 Degressivity, supported by several countries, offers perhaps the best long term 
option for expenditure control. The extent of the savings, however, depends on the 
exact implementation of the policy. At the extreme, payments could be reduced to 
zero over a fixed time period. Less radical alternatives put forward during 
negotiations included a proposal from France to reduce payments by 1-3% a year with 
exemptions for small farmers (thus also incorporating an element of modulation). The 
UK proposal was for 4% cuts across the board (given its higher percentage of large 
farmers, the UK has always opposed modulation). Estimates indicate cuts of 3% a 
year across all payments could save about euro 4.6 billion over seven years, whilst 
cuts of 3% a year to arable payments and 1% a year for other sectors would save 
about euro 3.1 billion. 
 This debate shows one potential problem of the balanced budget rule in the 
context of CAP reform. The imposition of a tight limit on CAP spending by the 
European Council led to the need for the second agreement. In terms of reaching an 
agreement that reduced spending, however, the alternatives were essentially to choose 
one (or more) of three options that would have controlled spending in a sustainable 
way over the longer term, or reducing the budgetary consequences of the price cuts 
simply by moderating them and so reducing the size of the direct payments. The latter 
was the easier politically, as it represents a continuation of existing policy, despite 
only being a short term palliative, whereas any one of the other three options 
represents a new direction for the CAP. The second agreement, moreover, implies a 
constraint on ‘new’ expenditures (direct payments), but renewed growth in 
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‘traditional’ expenditures (subsidies and intervention). Thus the response to the 
spending limit was to take the arable reform from the first agreement, remove the 
element that was a genuine step forward (eliminating price support under normal 
market conditions and, hence, the need for set aside to help limit production), instead 
rendering the ‘reform’ simply a small movement forward from the position agreed in 
1992. Moreover, the main change between the first and second agreements for the 
dairy sector was to delay the introduction of the measures until 2005/06. This will 
maintain the status quo for longer, delaying the introduction of direct payments, but 
also slowing down the restructuring of the dairy industry. 
 What this also shows is that whilst the balanced budget rule is a de-politicised, 
rule-based policy, there is still enormous scope for political debate in determining 
how a particular spending limit is to be achieved. France, as the least reform-minded 
country, wished to limit the scope of reform and managed to slow down the reform 
process to their pace. The European Council were faced with a simple option to 
water-down the first agreement reform package, or go for a more radical solution. The 
second agreement represented minimal change, which was desired by France, whilst 
also helping to contain budget costs, which was the desire of other countries, even if 
the second agreement may well not have contained costs sufficiently (see below). 
 France was, however, assisted in this debate by external factors. Events in 
Kosovo were proving a distraction and the EU needed to demonstrate it could put on 
a united front. The Commission had just resigned and the German government, in the 
chair, was facing domestic political difficulties. Failure to agree a reform would have 
further undermined the credibility of the EU. The debate was thus fundamentally 
between France (in opposing significant reform) and Germany (in the chair). Ackrill 
(1999b) refers to the ‘arm-wrestling’ between these two countries, who were aware 
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also of the importance of the Franco-German axis at a time when these other 
pressures were affecting the credibility and image of the EU. The budget and the 
balanced budget rule played a key role in forcing CAP reform, but there was still 
plenty of scope for political debate over how the spending limit was to be respected. 
 The 1999 reform also highlights a subtly changing characteristic of 
compulsory expenditures. The basic idea that such spending is open-ended remains 
true. The balanced budget rule, allied with the financial perspectives have, however, 
improved the transparency and accountability aspects of the budgetary process to the 
point that the process of CAP reform was, for the first time in 1999, discussed in the 
context of an explicit limit on budgetary expenditures. The reform is not a long term 
solution and was politically the less difficult option to agree upon. Even so, the 
increased influence of the EUB on sectoral policies, most notably the ‘compulsory 
expenditures’ of CAP guarantees, is increasing, in the wider context of public sector 
fiscal restraint. 
 This could already be seen in the process of negotiations for the 2000 budget. 
Cutbacks in payments to sugar and dairy producers were agreed in order to respect the 
spending limit for 2000 and remove an expected overshoot of about euro 180 million. 
Moreover, reductions have been proposed to subsidies applied to processed products 
containing CAP-supported commodities, such as biscuits and spirits. This is the first 
clear sign that the ‘new’ approach to financial restraint, where the CAP has to respect 
a pre-determined spending limit, is starting to take effect. Whilst this does not strictly 
change the fundamental nature of compulsory spending, the fact that the policy 
instruments are being adjusted to ensure respect of the spending limit year by year 
does indicate a change in attitude towards the open-ended nature of such spending. 
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The literature on balanced budget rules has supported the use of this rule for sub-
national governments, whilst broadly opposing its application to national government 
budgets. Little or no attention has so far been paid to the application of this rule to 
supra-national government budgets. Taking the specific case of the European Union 
budget, it has been argued that the application of the balanced budget rule has been 
entirely appropriate. Despite concerns over the possible problems this rule can 
generate, in the EU it has not only been suggested these concerns are unfounded, but 
indeed that the balanced budget rule has helped develop a system of sound financial 
management by highlighting the consequences of poor financial management. 
 Within the EU, expenditures are distinguished as being compulsory or non-
compulsory. Given the institutional constraints imposed on the permitted growth of 
non-compulsory expenditures, the balanced budget rule has the greatest impact on 
compulsory expenditures, principally CAP guarantees. Financial and accounting 
mismanagement in the 1980s were made visible by the existence of the balanced 
budget rule. This forced reforms to the budgetary process that improved both financial 
management and transparency. Continued growth in CAP expenditures, however, led 
to financial crisis for the EU in the mid 1980s. This resulted in CAP reforms driven, 
in most cases, by a need to respect the limits imposed on CAP spending and the 
budget generally. The most extreme example of this was the 1999 reform of the CAP 
where, for the first time, an expenditure limit was stated explicitly to which those 
negotiating the reform of the CAP had to adhere. 
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 Balanced budget rules imply a de-politicised decision making process. The 
reality has been that whilst CAP reforms have tended to coincide with times of budget 
crisis, there is nothing in the balanced budget rule to say how the CAP should be 
reformed. Political debate and compromise is still critical in determining the shape of 
CAP reforms, therefore. The CAP reform of 1999 led to such a degree of compromise 
that, in negotiating the EUB for 2000, adjustments have already had to be made. 
Further reform will therefore be needed if the spending limit is to be respected 
through to 2006. 
 
Plus ça change. 
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1 In addition, there are also appropriations for commitment. These do not equal own resources in any 
given year. They are, for any year, total non-differentiated appropriations plus commitment 
appropriations decided in that year and thus include expenditures to be met by budgets in future years. 
2 This depreciation is based on expected future re-sale value. Subsequent movements in market prices 
or exchange rates may mean stocks are over-depreciated, in which case member states reimburse the 
EUB the excess on re-sale. 
3 These limits have applied since 1995. Previously, the monetary reserve was triggered by exchange 
rate movements altering expenditures by at least 400 million ECU, up to a limit of 1000 million ECU. 
4 In this context, ‘consumers’ refers to those who first buy the product of farmers. This is not people in 
shops, but those who buy from the farmer before storing, transporting, processing and packaging the 
food before it reaches final consumers. These ‘first buyers’ pay less to farmers under the new policy. 
The effect of this on ‘final consumers’ in the shops is limited by the extent to which the price paid for 
food includes elements of the marketing margin - the processing, storage, transport and other costs that 
come between the farmer and the shopper. 
5 For simplicity, the outcome of the meeting of Ministers of Agriculture will be referred to as the first 
agreement and that of the European Council as the second agreement, the views of France 
notwithstanding. 
6 The beef regime was left relatively untouched by the second agreement. In the dairy sector, the 
reforms were broadly accepted, but the introduction of the changes would be delayed from 2003/04 to 
2005/06. In terms of the budgetary impact of the CAP reforms, the arable regime is of most interest 
and is thus the focus of attention here. 
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